# HOUSING AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP UNDER HETEROGENEOUS COSTS OF DEFAULT

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
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# QUESTION


- How does home equity affect entrepreneurship? Collateral Channel
  - ► Literature: Financial constraints are relevant for small/young firms (many papers on this link!)
- ► Important driver neglected: Insurance Channel
  - ▶ **Key Heterogeneity:** Whether lender has "recourse" to pursue assets beyond pledged collateral
  - ▶ **Key Friction in the US:** GSEs (Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae) provide state-level cross-subsidies (Hurst et al., 2015)

# Non-Recourse States



Source: Connecticut Office of Legislative Research (2010)

# House Prices and Firm Creation (< 10 Employees)



#### Blue=Non-Recourse, Red=Recourse

Note: Each observation is a Metropolitan Statistical Area. Source: United States Census Bureau.

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## This paper

- ▶ Matters for policy and provides insight into labor market dynamics and the role of home equity for entrepreneurs
- Proposes stylized career choice model with housing and mortgage default
  - ► Insurance role of default (recourse vs non-recourse)
  - ▶ Interaction with housing collateral channel
- ▶ Empirically validates predictions of the model with data
- Mortgage default regulation shapes exposure of small/young firms to business cycles
- ➤ Causal evidence that increase in house prices between 2000-07 relaxed credit constraints for small/young firms
  - ▶ Driven by areas where mortgage default is less costly


# Model - Mechanism

- ▶ Borrowing constrained households (even those with high entrepreneurial ability) may stay workers or become entrepreneurs and operate under their optimal scale
- ► A potential entrant to entrepreneurship must consider the cost of mortgage default
- ▶ An entrepreneur that gets a low ability realization and is underwater might not be able to re-pay his mortgage (double trigger)

# Environment

- ▶ Builds on Evans and Jovanovic (1989)
- ► Two periods, heterogeneous risk averse agents, partial equilibrium model
- ▶ Predetermined initial home equity  $(h_i)$
- ▶ Uncertainty about future house prices  $(P_2)$  and own entrepreneurial ability  $(\theta_i)$
- ► **Key elements:** State-level heterogeneity on mortgage default costs and homogeneous interest rates
- ► Agents choose:
  - 1. Career: worker (w) or entrepreneur (k)
  - 2. **Housing:** stay (pay mortgage) or default  $(d, \Phi, \rho(P_2))$

# HOUSING DECISION - SUMMARY



# CAREER CHOICE

#### Definition 1

Period 1 home equity threshold,  $h^*(\theta; P_2, d)$ , is the level of h that solves

$$V^W(h;d) = V^E(h;d)$$

When  $h \ge h^*(\theta; P_2, d)$  agents become entrepreneurs. When  $h < h^*(\theta; P_2, d)$  agents become workers.

#### Proposition 1

 $h^*(\theta; P_2, d)$  is increasing on d,  $V(P_2)$ , and  $V(\theta)$ . It is decreasing on  $\mathcal{E}(P_2)$  and  $\mathcal{E}(\theta)$ .

#### Corollary 1

If the probability density function of h is non-increasing around  $h^*(\theta; P_2, d)$ , the mass of new entrants due to an increase in  $P_2$  is decreasing on d.

## SUMMARY

- 1. As d increases, the default interval on  $P_2$  gets smaller
  - ▶ Ghent and Kudlyak (2011), Mitman (2012), Desai et al. (2013), Demiroglu et al. (2014), Li and Oswald (2014), Chan et al. (2015), among others
- 2. As d increases, the entry threshold  $h^*$  increases too
- 3. As  $P_2$  increases,  $h^*$  decreases. The mass of new entrepreneurs is decreasing on d
  - ► This is what the paper tests empirically

## Preview of Empirical Results

- ► Employment at small/young firms responded strongly to the increase in house prices between 2000 and 2007 (also number of firms and establishments)
  - Results are stronger in those areas where mortgage default is less costly
  - ► Even more for industries where the amount of start-up capital is lower
  - ▶ Not driven by construction or non-tradable sector
- ▶ Effects became smaller after 2007
- ► Evidence that the insurance and collateral channels are important for small business creation and growth

## **IDENTIFICATION**

- Main concern is that common unobserved factors could be driving up real estate prices and small firms growth
  - ► Expectations about income growth, regional investment opportunities, reverse causality
- ▶ Instrument for exogenous shock to house prices with the Saiz (2010) land unavailability measure
  - ► In low land availability areas, increases in demand for housing translate into higher prices (e.g. Manhattan, NY)
  - ► In high land availability areas, increases in demand have main effect on volume / new construction (e.g. Casper, WY)
- ▶ Identification assumption: Land unavailability only impacts firm creation through its effect on house prices

# EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY

$$\Delta^{00-07}HP_i = \phi_0 + \phi_1 SLU_i + \psi X_i + \eta_i$$

$$\begin{split} \Delta^{00-07} Y_{ijk} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 REC_i + \beta_2 \Delta^{00-07} \hat{HP}_i + \beta_3 \Delta^{00-07} \hat{HP}_i \times REC_i \\ & + \beta_4 \Delta^{00-07} \hat{HP}_i \times \mathbf{1}_j + \beta_5 \Delta^{00-07} \hat{HP}_i \times REC_i \times \mathbf{1}_j \\ & + \beta_5 \Delta^{00-07} \hat{HP}_i \times \mathbf{1}_k + \beta_6 \Delta^{00-07} \hat{HP}_i \times REC_i \times \mathbf{1}_k \\ & + \gamma X_i + \eta \mathbf{1}_j + \nu \mathbf{1}_k + \epsilon_{ijk}, \end{split}$$

- $\blacktriangleright$  MSAs indexed by i, age by j and size by k
- ▶  $HP_i$  is the log of house price in i,  $SLU_i$  is the share of land unavailability in i,  $X_i$  is a set of controls
- $ightharpoonup REC_i = 1$  if debt is recourse in i, equal to 0 otherwise
- $ightharpoonup Y_{ijk}$  is employment, number of firms, or number of establishments

# SIZE RESULTS (2000-07)

Table: All Industries

	House Price Growth		Employmen Growth	t	
	WLS (1)	WLS (2)	IV (3)	IV (4)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Share of Land Unavailability	0.22*** (0.10)				
Recourse Debt	(0.20)	-0.08	-0.05	-0.13*	
		(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	
House Price Growth		0.51***	0.56***	0.51***	
		(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.16)	
House Price Growth x Recourse		-0.30***	-0.20*	-0.45***	
		(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.11)	
House Price Growth x 10-19 Employees		-0.00*	-0.01*	-0.07*	
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.04)	
House Price Growth x 20-99 Employees		-0.08	-0.20**	-0.18**	
		(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)	
House Price Growth x >99 Employees		-0.01	-0.24**	-0.28**	
		(0.02)	(0.11)	(0.13)	
Constant	1.19**	-1.98***	-1.51**	-3.03***	
	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.70)	(0.68)	
2-Digit Industry Fixed Effects	N	N	N	Y	
Number of Observations	974	1167	1167	10348	
F-stat	18.21	294.10	260.92	1328.20	
R2	0.51	0.39	0.28	0.31	

# Size Results (2000-07) (2)

Table: By Start-up Capital Level

	Employment Growth		
	Start-up Start-u		
	Capital < P50	Capital > P50	
	IV	IV	
	(5)	(6)	
Recourse Debt	-0.09	-0.17**	
Recourse Debt			
House Price Growth	(0.08) 0.57***	(0.08) 0.28*	
nouse Frice Growth			
H D to G . d . D	(0.16) -0.53***	(0.15)	
House Price Growth x Recourse		-0.10*	
T D. G 1010 D	(0.15)	(0.06)	
House Price Growth x 10-19 Employees	-0.09*	-0.31*	
	(0.05)	(0.16)	
House Price Growth x 20-99 Employees	-0.17**	-0.37***	
	(0.08)	(0.18)	
House Price Growth x >99 Employees	-0.20**	-0.36***	
	(0.08)	(0.10)	
Constant	-2.86***	-3.00***	
	(0.76)	(0.81)	
2-Digit Industry Fixed Effects	Y	Y	
Number of Observations	5111	5237	
F-stat	790.10	187.93	
R2	0.38	0.28	

# Age Results (2000-07)

	House Price Growth	Employment Growth			
	WLS (1)	WLS (2)	IV (3)	IV (4)	
Share of Land Unavailability	0.29***				
	(0.01)				
House Price Growth	,	-0.29	-0.29	-0.29	
		(0.37)	(0.65)	(0.65)	
Recourse Debt		-0.05	-0.08	-0.08	
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	
House Price Growth x Recourse		0.55	1.64	1.64	
		(0.93)	(1.46)	(1.46)	
House Price Growth x Young Firm		0.33*		0.44***	
		(0.17)		(0.06)	
House Price Growth x Young Firm x Recourse		-0.34***		-0.42***	
		(0.23)		(0.04)	
House Price Growth x Small Firm		0.41	0.22**	0.16	
		(0.37)	(0.12)	(0.28)	
House Price Growth x Small Firm x Recourse		-0.10	-0.16**	-0.10	
		(1.13)	(0.08)	(0.19)	
Constant	0.31***	-0.14	0.08	0.08	
	(0.03)	(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.29)	
Number of Observations	22,973	14,079	12,346	12,346	
F-Statistic	2972	69.92	50.31	49.37	
R2	0.44	0.11	0.12	0.15	

## FINAL REMARKS

- ► Contribution to the debate about the channels that drove employment dynamics over the last decade
- Presents stylized career choice model with housing, mortgage default and financial frictions
- Provides insight into role of home equity and default laws for employment and firm creation dynamics
- Mortgage default regulation shapes exposure of small/young firms to business cycles
- ➤ Causal evidence that increase in house prices between 2000-07 relaxed credit constraints for small/young firms