

# Capital account liberalization and banking industry risks

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## Capital account liberalization

- **Economic Growth:** Eichengreen (2001); Quinn and Toyoda (2008)
- **Financial Crisis:** Singh (2003); Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)

*Flaws in extant literature*

capital account liberalization  $\Rightarrow$  banking industry risks

- The key role of financial intermediaries
- Informative dataset: bank-level
- Various dimensions of risks

Capital account liberalization *does* significantly affect bank risks.

- ▲ Conditional on domestic financial freedom
- ▲ Trade-off among various risk dimensions
- ▲ Categories and directions matter
- ▲ Possible channel
  - Bank income structure
  - Bank debt structure

## ▲ **Baseline model:** *Dynamic panel fixed-effect model*

$$RISK_{i,j,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 RISK_{i,j,t-1} + \beta_2 KA_{j,t} + \beta_3 DFR_{i,j,t} + \beta_4 KA_{j,t} * DFR_{i,j,t} \\ + \beta_5 BANK_{i,j,t} + \beta_6 MACRO_{j,t} + v_i + u_t + \varepsilon_{i,j,t}$$

## ▲ **Data**

- Accounting data from *Bankscope*; Stock market data from *Datastream*
- Filtering: 1%-99% (Weiβ et al., 2014)

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Range	<b>2000-2013</b>
Obs	<b>16,991</b>
Countries	<b>36 developed + 35 developing</b>
Bank types	725 commercial banks 705 bank holding & holding companies 38 saving banks 27 cooperative banks

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## Measuring banking industry risks

### ▲ Risk-taking

- Z-score, NPL and leverage: Laeven and Lavine (2009); Agoraki (2011)

$$Z - score = \frac{ROA + EA}{\sigma(ROA)}$$

### ▲ Structural credit risk

- One-year ahead default probability
- Moody's KMV model: Duan *et al.* (2005)

### ▲ Systemic risk

- Marginal expected shortfall (MES): Acharya *et al.* (2010)

$$MES = \sum_{m: \text{system in 5\% tail}} r_{m,i,j,t}$$

### ▲ Systematic and idiosyncratic risk

- Altunbas *et al.* (2015)

$$R_{i,j,t} = \beta_{i,j,t} R_{m,j,t} + \varepsilon_{i,j,t}$$

### ▲ Total risk

- S.D. of daily log excess return of the banking industry

# Measuring capital account liberalization

## ▲ De jure

- Government's policy stance
- Fernandez *et al.* (2015): a dummy for each category  $\implies$   $[0,1]$  indicator

## ▲ De facto

- Actual size of cross-border capital flow
- Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007): *financial integration index*

## Other included variables

### ▲ Domestic financial freedom

- A [0,1] indicator provided by the Heritage Foundation
  - △ The extent of government regulation of financial services
  - △ The degree of state intervention in banks and other financial firms through direct and indirect ownership
  - △ The government influence on the allocation of credit
  - △ The extent of financial and capital market development
  - △ Openness to foreign competition

### ▲ Control variables

- Determinants of risks  
*ownership, regulation, competition, tier 1 capital ratio, loan/asset ratio, etc.*
- Other control variables  
*bank size, fixed asset ratio, rule of law, GDP per capita, GDP growth, etc.*



## Baseline model

	Z-score	Systemic Risk	Total Risk
KA	<b>-0.868</b> <b>(0.417)**</b>	<b>0.030</b> <b>(0.011)***</b>	0.007 (0.016)
Domestic	0.287 (0.521)	<b>0.040</b> <b>(0.012)***</b>	0.001 (0.015)
KA*Domestic	<b>2.412</b> <b>(0.661)***</b>	<b>-0.047</b> <b>(0.014)***</b>	-0.011 (0.023)
	...	...	...
N	7,487	6,216	732
$R^2$	0.63	0.68	0.47
Bank Effect	YES	YES	YES
Year Effect	YES	YES	YES

## Baseline model

	Z-score	Default	Systemic	Systematic	Idiosyncratic
KA	<b>-0.868</b> (0.417)**	0.016 (0.158)	<b>0.030</b> (0.011)***	<b>0.260</b> (0.121)**	<b>-0.007</b> (0.002)***
Domestic	0.287 (0.521)	-0.088 (0.193)	<b>0.040</b> (0.012)***	<b>0.403</b> (0.142)***	<b>-0.010</b> (0.003)***
KA*Domestic	<b>2.412</b> (0.661)***	-0.007 (0.233)	<b>-0.047</b> (0.014)***	<b>-0.363</b> (0.166)**	0.005 (0.003)
	...	...	...	...	...
	...	...	...	...	...
N	7,487	2,377	6,216	5,613	5,613
$R^2$	0.63	0.55	0.68	0.78	0.88
Bank Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

## Liberalization Directions and Categories

- **Direction matters**

$$RISK_{i,j,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 RISK_{i,j,t-1} + \beta_2 DFR_{i,j,t} + \beta_3 InKA_{j,t} + \beta_4 OutKA_{j,t} + \beta_5 InKA_{j,t} * DFR_{i,j,t} + \beta_6 OutKA_{j,t} * DFR_{i,j,t} + \beta_7 BANK_{i,j,t} + \beta_7 MACRO_{j,t} + v_i + u_t + \varepsilon_{i,j,t}$$

- Buiter and Taci (2003); Giannetti (2007); Aizenman and Pasricha (2013)

- **Category matters**

$$RISK_{i,j,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 RISK_{i,j,t-1} + \beta_2 CategoryKA_{j,t} + \beta_3 DFR_{i,j,t} + \beta_4 CategoryKA_{j,t} * DFR_{i,j,t} + \beta_5 BANK_{i,j,t} + \beta_6 MACRO_{j,t} + v_i + u_t + \varepsilon_{i,j,t}$$

## Transmission mechanism

- **Outline**

- *Capital account liberalization affects bank income and funding structure*

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Fundingstructure}_{i,j,t} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Fundingstructure}_{i,j,t-1} + \beta_2 \text{KA}_{j,t} + \beta_3 \text{DFR}_{i,j,t} \\ & + \beta_4 \text{KA}_{j,t} * \text{DFR}_{i,j,t} + \beta_5 \text{BANK}_{i,j,t} + \beta_6 \text{MACRO}_{j,t} + v_i + u_t + \varepsilon_{i,j,t} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Incomestructure}_{i,j,t} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Incomestructure}_{i,j,t-1} + \beta_2 \text{KA}_{j,t} + \beta_3 \text{DFR}_{i,j,t} \\ & + \beta_4 \text{KA}_{j,t} * \text{DFR}_{i,j,t} + \beta_5 \text{BANK}_{i,j,t} + \beta_6 \text{MACRO}_{j,t} + v_i + u_t + \varepsilon_{i,j,t} \end{aligned}$$

- *Bank income and funding structure affects bank risks*

## Transmission mechanism

- Capital account liberalization affects bank income and funding structure

	Deposit Funding	Noninterest Income Ratio
KA	<b>-7.937</b> <b>(2.614)***</b>	<b>8.547</b> <b>(4.018)**</b>
Domestic	<b>-9.871</b> <b>(3.065)***</b>	-3.654 (4.251)
KA*Domestic	<b>8.168</b> <b>(3.628)**</b>	1.131 (5.735)
	...	...
	...	...
N	8,831	5,468
$R^2$	0.95	0.86
Bank Effect	YES	YES
Year Effect	YES	YES

# Transmission mechanism

- **Bank income and funding structure affects bank risks**

- **Literature**

- Stroh(2004); Demurgic-Kunt and Huizinga (2010); Lepetit et al. (2008); Baele et al. (2007); Wanger (2010); Brunnermeier et al. (2012)

- **Our empirical approach**

$$RISK_{i,j,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 RISK_{i,j,t-1} + \beta_2 Fundingstructure_{i,j,t} + \beta_3 Fundingstructure_{i,j,t}^2 + \beta_4 BANK_{i,j,t} + \beta_5 MACRO_{j,t} + v_i + u_t + \varepsilon_{i,j,t}$$

$$RISK_{i,j,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 RISK_{i,j,t-1} + \beta_2 Incomestructure_{i,j,t} + \beta_3 Incomestructure_{i,j,t}^2 + \beta_4 BANK_{i,j,t} + \beta_5 MACRO_{j,t} + v_i + u_t + \varepsilon_{i,j,t}$$

## Transmission mechanism

- Bank funding structure affects bank risks

	Z-score $\times 10^3$	Default $\times 10^3$	Systemic $\times 10^3$	Systematic $\times 10^3$	Idiosyncratic $\times 10^3$
Deposit Funding	<b>19.084</b> <b>(7.032)***</b>	-1.770 (2.822)	<b>(0.022</b> <b>(0.156)*</b>	-1.988 (1.752)	<b>0.090</b> <b>(0.033)***</b>
Deposit Funding2	<b>-0.195</b> <b>(0.058)***</b>	0.003 (0.022)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.019 (0.013)	<b>-0.001</b> <b>(0.000)***</b>
	...	...	...	...	...
N	7,402	2,383	6,261	5,644	5,644
$R^2$	0.62	0.54	0.68	0.78	0.88
Bank Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

## Transmission mechanism

- Bank income structure affects bank risks

	Z-score *10 <sup>3</sup>	Default *10 <sup>3</sup>	Systemic *10 <sup>3</sup>	Systematic *10 <sup>3</sup>	Idiosyncratic *10 <sup>3</sup>
Nonin Share	<b>3.455</b> <b>(1.893)*</b>	-0.296 (0.264)	0.020 (0.025)	<b>-0.777</b> <b>(0.191)***</b>	0.000 (0.003)
Nonin Share2	<b>-0.029</b> <b>(0.010)***</b>	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.001)	<b>0.000</b> <b>(0.000)***</b>
	...	...	...	...	...
	...	...	...	...	...
N	5,237	1,441	4,488	4,072	4,072
R <sup>2</sup>	0.66	0.70	0.71	0.87	0.86
Bank Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES



## ▲ Issues of endogeneity

- 2000-2007 subsample
- GMM-IV: lagged value

## ▲ Sample selection

- including non-listed banks

## ▲ Measurements

- De jure index of capital account liberalization
- Alternative measurements of banking industry risks

# Conclusion

- ▲ A new framework for analyzing policy
- ▲ Potential Trade-off of capital account liberalization on banking industry risks
- ▲ Possible transmission channels
  
- The importance of liberalization sequence
  
- Monetary policy and regulations: identifying the risk-taking channels

# Thank You!